


































                                                 
∗  Robin M. Hogarth is ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, 
Spain. I am grateful for comments on earlier drafts by Antoni Bosch, Andreas Ortmann, Chris 
Starmer, and Robert Sugden. This research was financed partially by a grant from the Spanish 
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología.   
 






The demands of representative design, as formulated by Egon Brunswik 
(1956), set a high methodological standard. Both experimental participants and the 
situations with which they are faced should be representative of the populations to 
which researchers claim to generalize results.  Failure to observe the latter has led to 
notable experimental failures in psychology from which economics could learn. It 
also raises questions about the meaning of testing economic theories in “abstract” 
environments. Logically, abstract tests can only be generalized to “abstract realities” 
and these may or may not have anything to do with the “empirical realities” 
experienced by economic actors. 
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  2  It is hard to deny the value of experiments and, yet, not all experiments 
produce results that people trust.  What, it can be asked, characterizes experiments 
that generate “valid” knowledge from those that do not?  The goal of this paper is to 
illuminate this question.  
  The answer can be sketched as follows.  Experimentation can have many goals 
(Hogarth, 1982; 1986). One major goal is to test theory by which is meant statements 
of conditional expectation, e.g., if condition x holds, effect y is more likely to occur.  
(Of course, x and y are typically more complicated than this simple notation suggests.)   
  Second, in conducting experiments, investigators are, in effect, building 
models of situations, models that Chapanis (1961) appropriately termed “replica” 
models.  That is, 
The essential thing about replica models is that they look like the thing being 
modeled in some respect….A globe is a replica model of the earth because, in 
some respects, it looks like the earth.  (Chapanis, 1961, pp. 115-116). 
 
  Third, the belief people place in the results of experiments depends on how 
well the replica model captures the intended “reality” on relevant dimensions.  In 
other words, a globe is a good model of the earth if the relevant issue only concerns 
its being a sphere but not if the investigator is interested in, say, the effects of 
different climates by regions.   
In brief, I shall argue that the principles of representative design (Brunswik, 
1956) can be used to assess whether experiments capture the relevant features of 
intended realities.   Central to this concept is the notion that an experiment can be 
thought of as a sample of behavior.  I therefore elaborate on this and emphasize that, 
to generalize results, not only should samples of participants be representative, but 
also samples of tasks or situations. By respecting the demands of representative 
design, researchers can greatly increase the value of experiments. I also stress the 
  3importance of contextual variables that are typically ignored in economics. Finally, I 
conclude that although representative design demands much of experimentalists, it 
provides a clear rationale for generalizing results. 
 
Representativeness and representative design 
In this paper, I emphasize the use of experiments to test the validity of theories 
that can be described in terms of behavioral regularities or, as stated above, statements 
of conditional expectation.  As examples, consider statements such as   “demand for a 
product decreases as its price increases” or “people are more likely to cheat when 
faced with an anonymous ‘partner’ than one whom they know” or “people maximize 
expected utility in choosing between gambles.”  Whereas not all theories are 
necessarily defined in these terms (some exist only in imaginary worlds), the domain 
of theory testing I consider is large and merits attention.  
When people talk about the “representativeness” of experiments they     
typically refer to what psychologists call “external validity,” that is, can the effects 
observed be generalized outside the experimental setting?
1  Using Chapanis’s (1961) 
replica model analogy, this can be framed by asking how well the model mimics 
reality on characteristics relevant to the theory.  Is the behavior a “good” sample or 
representation of the intended reality on the relevant dimensions?  
Brunswik’s (1956) concept of representative design provides an intellectually 
satisfying way of framing this question.  An experiment, it is argued, can be viewed as 
a sample. In this case, sampling theory determines whether results can be generalized 
appropriately to a particular population.  To do this, however, investigators need to 
specify relevant characteristics of both samples and populations. In addition, sampling 
                                                 
1  I do not comment on the requirement that experiments should meet the criterion of internal validity, 
i.e., whether effects observed can be deemed valid within the experimental conditions.  As is well 
known, internal validity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for external validity. 
  4should take place on two dimensions. One involves the participants; the other 
concerns the situations or tasks with which the participants are confronted.  Valid 
inferences can only be achieved by sampling in a representative manner on both 
dimensions. 
Describing experiments by whether representative sampling has taken place on 
both dimensions (yes or no) leads to a 2 x 2 classification as illustrated in Figure 1. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Cell 1 is the ideal situation in which both participants and situations are 
representative.  In cell 2, we have representative participants but not in a 
representative situation. In cell 3, the situation is representative, but the participants 
are not. Finally, in cell 4 neither participants nor the situation are representative.   
Clearly, it would be wonderful if all experiments were in cell 1.  However, they are 
not.  The issues therefore center on how important this is in particular cases and what 
can be done about it.   
Sampling participants. One of my colleagues, a professor of statistics, enjoys 
pointing out that the participants in experiments on our campus are not     
“representative.” Typically aged 18 through 22, and majoring in economics or 
business, approximately half are female and gained access to our public university by 
achieving good grades in examinations.  In many respects, they are probably 
“representative” of subject pools for much of experimental economics. The relevant 
question is whether they can be considered “representative” for purposes of testing 
economic theories. 
If by “representative” my colleague means “representative of the population at 
large,” he is correct.  This goal can only be achieved by sampling participants from 
  5the general population.  However, few – if any – experimentalists do this.  Does this 
matter?   
The answer, I believe, depends on the extent to which characteristics of actors 
are relevant to the theories being tested in the experiment.  In many psychological 
experiments, for example, basic cognitive processes such as limits of attention and 
memory span are unlikely to be affected by differential sampling of participants 
(unless, for example, one was specifically studying skills of particular groups such as 
the very young or elderly).   Thus, results from the “typical” subject pool are unlikely 
to be distorted. 
2 
Although it is tempting to think of economic theory as being universal, it is not 
clear that it is (see Cubitt, this volume; Guala, this volume).  On the other hand, the 
theory does not specify, for example, demographic characteristics of its actors. What 
it does assume is that actors are informed in the sense that they have some experience 
of the tasks with which they are confronted.  However, what being informed really 
means is not clear.  In practice, experimentalists can and do typically ensure that 
participants understand instructions and/or take part in learning trials. 
There are, of course, some economics experiments where roles are important 
and, for which, it is hard to train student participants adequately. For instance, 
consider situations where students are required to simulate managers and deal with 
issues such as hiring and firing that may be difficult to conceptualize unless one has 
had similar experiences. In these situations, it is not clear how to verify that 
participants are representative.  Indeed, Cooper, Kagel, Lo, and Gu (1999) have 
                                                 
2 On the other hand, some recent evidence indicates that basic cognitive processes 
such as perceptions of “figure” and “ground” might be much more subject to cultural 
differences – and thus participants sampled – than previously thought (Nisbett, 2003).   
 
  6demonstrated how decisions taken by practicing managers differ systematically from 
those of student participants in an experiment involving the same industrial game.  
Parenthetically, I have often heard economists criticize experiments precisely 
because they are conducted with students. (Results are said not to be 
“representative.”)  However, if we take the fictional, theoretical characters that 
populate models of, say, rational expectations seriously, then nobody can be said to be 
representative in terms of assumed information processing capacity.  In this case, if 
representative experimental subjects are needed to test the theory, the theory is not 
testable. 
Sampling situations.  Whereas, in principle, investigators can overcome non-
representative sampling of participants by recruiting people with appropriate profiles, 
the representative sampling of tasks typically provides the greater challenge. I provide 
two examples. Both involve attempts to measure human cognitive abilities: one to 
remember; the other to judge distances and the sizes of objects. 
  The first set of studies attempted to study and measure the limits of human 
memory. The basic paradigm (Ebbinghaus, 1885) involved having people memorize – 
in rote fashion – series of so-called nonsense syllables presented in random orders 
(e.g., DAX, ZUC, etc.). These attempts were successful in that they showed that 
memory is limited in measurable ways (i.e., the numbers of nonsense syllables that 
people can repeat correctly under specific conditions).  However, memorizing 
nonsense syllables does not characterize how people encounter and remember 
information in the natural environment.   
Imagine, for example, that you have just heard a good story that you would 
like to tell others. It is unlikely that you would remember the story verbatim, (i.e., as 
though memorizing nonsense syllables). Instead, you would explicitly use context and 
  7meaning to remember key features of the story (i.e., characters, specific actions, a 
time line of events, and the conclusion), and when re-telling the story, you would 
construct your narrative from this context and meaning.  In other words, your memory 
relies heavily on contextual knowledge that enabled you to understand the story in the 
first place and also allows you to construct your version when you tell it (Bartlett, 
1932).  The nonsense syllables paradigm does not represent how people learn in their 
natural environment.  Indeed, this paradigm misled psychological researchers for 
years. 
The second study was conducted by Brunswik (1944).  His interest lay in 
investigating the ability to estimate distances and the sizes of objects and, contrary to 
the memory researchers, he investigated this in the person’s natural environment (the 
University of California at Berkeley).  The methodology consisted in having the 
person (a student) followed by an associate over a period of four weeks during which 
she was instructed to behave in her normal fashion.  However, at irregular – or 
random moments – the participant was asked to estimate the sizes of objects that 
happened to be in her visual field as well as the distances from the objects.  The 
associate then checked the accuracy of the estimates by measuring them.   Note that in 
this study the experimenter did not choose the specific “experimental tasks” per se but 
instead defined a process by which these were a random sample of the participant’s 
experience. Thus, although the study involved but a single participant, valid 
inferences could be made about her ability to judge distances and the sizes of objects. 
Although conceptually sound, Brunswik’s methodology is demanding and this 
may, in part, explain why it has not been used more in psychological research.   
However, recent years have seen growing use of what is now referred to as the 
Experience Sampling Method (ESM) using modern technology (e.g., beepers, mobile 
  8telephones, palmtop computers) to prompt participants to respond to questionnaires at 
random moments (see, e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hurlburt, 1997). For 
example, in a recent study I used mobile telephones to sample the decision making 
behaviors of undergraduate students and business executives (Hogarth, in press).   
Specifically, I was interested in how much feedback people receive and/or expect to 
receive on the many decisions they make each day. By sampling individual 
participants up to four times a day for up to two weeks, I obtained random samples of 
the participants’ decisions and was able to characterize the feedback they received or 
expected to receive on their decisions. This, in turn, is information that can be used to 
develop a deeper understanding of the nature of the decision making environments 
that people inhabit. Incidentally, although not a major study, the methodology 
generated some 1,200 data points (i.e., decisions) from 34 participants such that good 
estimates could be obtained at both individual and group levels. 
Attention to how tasks are sampled is also relevant to the considerable 
controversy in the decision making literature concerning whether people violate 
axioms of rational choice. In much of this research, people’s decisions are examined 
in isolated situations and comparisons are typically made between groups of 
participants that receive different versions of the same problem (see, e.g., Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979).  The intriguing – and disturbing – results of this between subjects 
research is that different presentations of the same substantive problems 
systematically produce different choices.   However, the validity of these results have 
been questioned on the grounds that, outside the laboratory, people typically make 
series of choices and receive feedback in what could be described more as a within 
subjects design for which the static between subjects design is inappropriate (cf., 
Gigerenzer, 1996; Hogarth, 1981).  As in many debates, I believe that neither side is 
  9“correct.”  More importantly, people confront decisions in their lives that can be 
modeled by both between- and within subjects research designs.  What should be 
criticized in the original research is the failure to specify the population of conditions 
outside the laboratory of which the experimental tasks can be considered a 
representative sample.  
Recent work on risk taking by Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004) provides a nice 
illustration. These researchers distinguish two ways in which people can acquire 
information about risky choices.  In one – typically used in experiments – all 
information is provided in the form of static descriptions. In the other – probably 
more frequent outside the laboratory – people acquire information experientially 
across time. This leads to an important difference in how people handle risks that 
occur infrequently. Faced with static descriptions, people are made aware of small 
probabilities of incurring risks and may even “over-weight” them.  On the other hand, 
because, by definition, outside the laboratory infrequent events occur infrequently, 
people have little experience with them. Thus, in these circumstances risks associated 
with small probabilities are not over-weighted (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 
2004).  
The correspondence between laboratory and external reality is, of course, an 
issue of great concern in many economics experiments. Thus, for example, incentives 
are typically real with participants being rewarded according to the level of their 
performance.
3 Moreover, in market experiments the rules under which participants 
operate are well defined and participants are provided with opportunities to learn from 
experience.  However, although certain critical features of “real-world” markets are 
represented, it is not clear how well these “replica” models match the characteristics 
                                                 
3 The extent to which incentives make a difference is, however, unclear (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999).   
  10of these markets on all relevant dimensions.  For example, does it make a difference 
that market experiments typically involve a limited number of participants whereas 
real markets can involve millions?  
Economists are adept at handling the requirements of classic, factorial 
experimental designs. However, a major problem with factorial experiments is that 
the basic logic (i.e., the orthogonal variation of variables) precludes generalizing 
results outside the laboratory (Brunswik, 1956). The rationale does seem impeccable.  
By varying one variable at a time and holding all others constant, one can isolate the 
effects. However, outside the laboratory all other variables are not constant and 
variables are not orthogonal. Thus, estimates of the sizes of effects (based on the 
experiment) are subject to other forces.  You can design factorial worlds within an 
experiment but this may not have much to do with what happens outside it.      
On the positive side, it should be noted that economists have looked at 
whether results that looked surprising within experimental laboratories (from the 
viewpoint of economic theory) can also be observed in more realistic environments, 
i.e., attempts have been made to demonstrate external validity.    As a case in point, 
consider judgments of willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept on issues as 
trivial as small gambles to those as consequential as compensation awards in civil 
trials.  Whereas the response mechanisms can be justified by economic theory, people 
are not machines that necessarily produce appropriate responses. Indeed, most people 
have limited experience with such mechanisms and responses are often sensitive to 
normatively irrelevant considerations whether in or outside the experimental 
laboratory.  For good examples, see Sunstein, Hastie, Payne, Schkade and Viscusi 
(2002). In addition, consider evidence that supports prospect theory “in the wild” 
(Camerer, 2000) or empirical studies in behavioral finance (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). 
  11Context in experiments. An intriguing aspect of many experiments in 
economics is that tasks are described in abstract terms. The rationale is that because 
the theory is stated in abstract terms, it should be tested in an abstract way.    
  It is important to emphasize that this argument does appear to meet the 
criterion of the representativeness of tasks. That is, the abstract experimental task (or 
sample) is representative of the abstract theory (or population).  However, in this case, 
the reasoning is somewhat circular and possibly even self-fulfilling.  Surely, in 
economics the theory is useful to the extent that it predicts behavior in the economy 
and not just abstract representations?  In addition, if we cannot say that the abstract 
theory is “universal” (cf., Cubitt, this volume; Guala, this volume), what limits should 
we place on the abstract version that is tested? 
Thus, “abstract” experiments are interesting but only as a first step.  The next, 
and more important step, is to investigate the theory in situations that are 
representative of the economy at large. This does not mean, of course, that tests need 
to be done on all possible objects. One can sample situations relevant to the theory 
being generalized.  For example, if the theory is being used to investigate issues in the 
market for pig-iron as opposed to, say, paintings, then why not use stories that involve 
pig-iron or similar products?  
The importance of this point is bolstered by the fact that one of the major 
lessons of research in psychology over the last 50 years has been the importance of 
context. People react differently to structurally identical problems that are presented 
in different ways, for example, abstract vs. concrete, or two different contexts.
4  
Consider Wason’s (1966) famous card problem.   
                                                 
4 I do not claim to be the first person to make this point to economists. See, e.g., Ortmann and 
Gigerenzer (1997). 
  12Imagine that you have in front of you four cards that show (from left to right) 
the letter A, the letter B, the number 4, and the number 7. You are informed 
that each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. You are also 
informed of the rule, “If a card has a vowel on one side, it has an even number 
on the other side.”  Given the four cards in front of you, which and only which 
cards would you need to turn to verify whether the rule is correct? (Hogarth, 
2001, p. 116). 
 
  The modal responses to this problem (replicated many times) are the cards 
showing the letter A and the number 4 and the card showing just the letter A.  In its 
abstract form, the problem requires testing a logical rule of the format if p then q, that 
is, if vowel then even number.  In this case, the correct answer is to test the first and 
the fourth cards, thereby providing both possible confirming and disconfirming 
checks. On the other hand, when the structurally identical problem is presented in 
more familiar contexts, people have little difficulty in answering the question 
correctly.  For example, consider the following variation (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). 
Imagine that you work in a bar and have to enforce the rule that, in order to 
drink alcoholic beverages, patrons must be over twenty-one years old.  You 
observe four “young” people in the bar: the first is drinking beer; the second is 
drinking Coke; the third is twenty-five years old; and the fourth is sixteen 
years old. Whom do you check in order to verify that the rule is being 
enforced?  (Hogarth, 2001, p. 116). 
 
  People do not see the structure of problems directly. Rather, they infer the 
structure from context (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981) and this conditions the meaning 
they attribute to their perceptions. 
Economic phenomena are not immune to these kinds of effects. For example,   
much has been made of the gambling metaphor of choice that characterizes behavior 
in terms of probabilities and utilities. However, there is abundant evidence that choice 
– as well as the assessment of risk – is highly dependent on context (see, e.g., 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Nor can market discipline be counted on 
to eliminate “irrelevant” effects (Camerer, 2000).     
 
  13Concluding comments 
For experimental studies to be judged as “representative” – and thus to 
generalize – claims need to be established for this (relative to the theory being tested) 
on the dimensions of both experimental participants and situations.  This, in turn, 
requires specifying what the theory has to say in respect of both people and situations. 
Moreover, tests should be made of the sensitivity of results to the selection of 
participants and experimental situations. Often, understanding an effect can only be 
achieved when it can be turned “on” and “off” in experimental settings.  For example, 
how big does a loss need to be before people are concerned by loss aversion?  
Theories that are “abstract” pose their particular problems – does this mean 
that the findings should hold up under all possible environments or none?  If 
economists wish to apply abstract theories to concrete situations then the latter need to 
be sampled in the testing process.  
Whereas this article is a comment about experiments in economics, it would 
be a mistake to believe that all psychologists advocate and use representative design 
in their work.  In a recent review, Dhami, Hertwig, and Hoffrage (2004) point out the 
principles of representative design are not covered in most textbooks on methodology 
in psychology and that even those psychologists whose work follows the Brunswikian 
tradition do not necessarily follow these principles.  One reason, of course, is that they   
are hard to implement. There is a need, for example, to specify carefully the 
population (i.e., the conditions) to which experimental results can be generalized.  In 
addition, in most cases genuine random sampling of situations (that guarantees 
probabilistically representative statements) can not be achieved and thus judgment 
must be exercised in selecting quota-like samples of situations.  The principles are 
hard to follow but, in my view, do provide a clear rationale for assessing whether 
  14results can be generalized.  At the end of their review, however, Dhami et al. (2004) 
do strike an optimistic note.  Modern technology has increased our ability to conduct 
more adequate cross-situational sampling, e.g., use of extensive, modern computer 
records (webpages and email), technology for experiential sampling (mobile 
telephones, palmtop computers – see above), virtual computer simulations, and so on.  
There are ways to move in the direction advocated by representative design.  
Finally, experimental economics provides but one set of tools.  If theories are 
important, they should be tested by different methodologies.  Indeed, as noted above, 
the principles of representative design can be profitably used in programs of research 
that deliberately employ both experimental and field (empirical) data in testing and 
extending theories.  These, however, often require collaboration between researchers 
in different silos of academic disciplines the difficulty of which may be the greatest 
obstacle in generalizing results.  
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